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Fairness

Brad Hooker
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 8, No. 4 (Aug., 2005), pp. 329-352
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504361
Page Count: 24
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Fairness
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Abstract

The main body of this paper assesses a leading recent theory of fairness, a theory put forward by John Broome. I discuss Broome's theory partly because of its prominence and partly because I think it points us in the right direction, even if it takes some missteps. In the course of discussing Broome's theory, I aim to cast light on the relation of fairness to consistency, equality, impartiality, desert, rights, and agreements. Indeed, before I start assessing Broome's theory, I discuss two very popular conceptions of fairness that contrast with his. One of these very popular conceptions identifies fairness with the equal and impartial application of rules. The other identifies fairness with all-things-considered moral rightness.

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