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Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's "Ethics"

Roopen N. Majithia
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 187-200
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504396
Page Count: 14
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Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's "Ethics"
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Abstract

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.

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