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Agent-based Theories of Right Action
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 9, No. 5 (Nov., 2006), pp. 505-515
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504422
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Morality, Virtue, Moral agency, Moral judgment, Categorical imperatives, Virtue ethics, Kantianism, Consequentialism, Ethical behavior, Children
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In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice © 2006 Springer