Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

Patricia Marino
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol. 9, No. 5 (Nov., 2006), pp. 517-533
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504423
Page Count: 17
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas
Preview not available

Abstract

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes -- in cases of moral dilemmas -- avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to 'all-in attitudes' or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments -- one for which conflicts are allowed -- that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[517]
    [517]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
518
    518
  • Thumbnail: Page 
519
    519
  • Thumbnail: Page 
520
    520
  • Thumbnail: Page 
521
    521
  • Thumbnail: Page 
522
    522
  • Thumbnail: Page 
523
    523
  • Thumbnail: Page 
524
    524
  • Thumbnail: Page 
525
    525
  • Thumbnail: Page 
526
    526
  • Thumbnail: Page 
527
    527
  • Thumbnail: Page 
528
    528
  • Thumbnail: Page 
529
    529
  • Thumbnail: Page 
530
    530
  • Thumbnail: Page 
531
    531
  • Thumbnail: Page 
532
    532
  • Thumbnail: Page 
533
    533