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Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity

Ross P. Cameron
Synthese
Vol. 156, No. 1 (May, 2007), pp. 143-159
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653510
Page Count: 17
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Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis' Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism — the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection — and argue that Lewis' response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis' methodology with Forrest's in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.

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