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Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract

Brian Skyrms
Synthese
Vol. 160, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), pp. 21-25
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653643
Page Count: 5
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Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract
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Abstract

The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.

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