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Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust

Terry Horgan
Synthese
Vol. 160, No. 2 (Jan., 2008), pp. 155-159
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653654
Page Count: 5
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Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust
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Abstract

I maintain, in defending "thirdism," that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the "preliminary probability" 1/4 to the statement S: "Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads." (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.

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