Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Time, Tense, Truth

Katalin Farkas
Synthese
Vol. 160, No. 2 (Jan., 2008), pp. 269-284
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653661
Page Count: 16
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Time, Tense, Truth
Preview not available

Abstract

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[269]
    [269]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
270
    270
  • Thumbnail: Page 
271
    271
  • Thumbnail: Page 
272
    272
  • Thumbnail: Page 
273
    273
  • Thumbnail: Page 
274
    274
  • Thumbnail: Page 
275
    275
  • Thumbnail: Page 
276
    276
  • Thumbnail: Page 
277
    277
  • Thumbnail: Page 
278
    278
  • Thumbnail: Page 
279
    279
  • Thumbnail: Page 
280
    280
  • Thumbnail: Page 
281
    281
  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284