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Time, Tense, Truth
Vol. 160, No. 2 (Jan., 2008), pp. 269-284
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653661
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Indexicality, Forest fires, Theoretical linguistics, Argumentation, Biconditionals, Reality, Temporality, Truth condition, Metaphysics, Interrogative sentences
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A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.
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