You are not currently logged in.
Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:
Kripke's Paradox and the Church-Turing Thesis
Mark D. Sprevak
Vol. 160, No. 2 (Jan., 2008), pp. 285-295
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653662
Page Count: 11
Preview not available
Kripke (1982, "Wittgenstein on rules and private language". Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) presents a rule-following paradox in terms of what we meant by our past of "plus", but the same paradox can be applied to any other term in natural language. Many responses to the paradox concentrate on fixing determinate meaning for "plus", or for a small class of other natural language terms. This raises a problem: how can these particular responses be generalised to the whole of natural language? In this paper, I propose a solution. I argue that if natural language is computable in a sense defined below, and the Church—Turing thesis is accepted, then this auxiliary problem can be solved.
Synthese © 2008 Springer