Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Virtue and Voluntarism

James Montmarquet
Synthese
Vol. 161, No. 3, Epistemic Deontologism (Apr., 2008), pp. 393-402
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653702
Page Count: 10
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Virtue and Voluntarism
Preview not available

Abstract

My aim here is to characterize a certain type of 'virtue approach' to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of 'weak doxastic voluntarism.'

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[393]
    [393]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
394
    394
  • Thumbnail: Page 
395
    395
  • Thumbnail: Page 
396
    396
  • Thumbnail: Page 
397
    397
  • Thumbnail: Page 
398
    398
  • Thumbnail: Page 
399
    399
  • Thumbnail: Page 
400
    400
  • Thumbnail: Page 
401
    401
  • Thumbnail: Page 
402
    402