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Virtue and Voluntarism
Vol. 161, No. 3, Epistemic Deontologism (Apr., 2008), pp. 393-402
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653702
Page Count: 10
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My aim here is to characterize a certain type of 'virtue approach' to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of 'weak doxastic voluntarism.'
Synthese © 2008 Springer