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Could There Be Exactly Two Things?

Juan Comesaña
Synthese
Vol. 162, No. 1 (May, 2008), pp. 31-35
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653710
Page Count: 5
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Could There Be Exactly Two Things?
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Abstract

Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let's call that doctrine "Universalism"). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.

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