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The Methodology of Genuine Modal Realism
Chris John Daly
Vol. 162, No. 1 (May, 2008), pp. 37-52
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27653711
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Modal realism, A priori knowledge, Epistemic justification, Modal epistemology, Metaphysics, Inference, Explanation theories, Justified beliefs, Truth, Circular logic
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David Lewis's genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis's defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis's attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.
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