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Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble

Ross P. Cameron
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 140, No. 1, Selected Papers from the 2007 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (Jul., 2008), pp. 1-18
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734277
Page Count: 18
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Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble
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Abstract

What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.

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