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Dispositions, Rules, and Finks

Toby Handfield and Alexander Bird
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 140, No. 2 (Aug., 2008), pp. 285-298
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734296
Page Count: 14
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Dispositions, Rules, and Finks
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Abstract

This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least some of the interfering dispositions are both relatively permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence of these intrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent false.

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