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The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects

Uriah Kriegel
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 141, No. 1 (Oct., 2008), pp. 79-95
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734316
Page Count: 17
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The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects
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Abstract

The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.

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