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Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory
Anna Bjurman Pautz
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 141, No. 2 (Nov., 2008), pp. 147-156
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734323
Page Count: 10
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There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2008 Springer