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Reliability as a Virtue

Robert Audi
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 142, No. 1, The First Midwest Epistemology Workshop (Jan., 2009), pp. 43-54
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734350
Page Count: 12
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Reliability as a Virtue
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Abstract

This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue, it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.

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