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Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments

Martin Montminy
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 143, No. 3 (Apr., 2009), pp. 341-356
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734409
Page Count: 16
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Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments
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Abstract

Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.

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