You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Experience and Self-Consciousness
Joseph K. Schear
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 144, No. 1, Selected Papers from the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2008 Meeting (May, 2009), pp. 95-105
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734429
Page Count: 11
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Self consciousness, Phenomenology, Subjectivity, Shoemaking, Consciousness, Refrigerators, Concept of being, Self referential statements, Phenomena, Interviews
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers "yes". I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the "interview argument," and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2009 Springer