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Experience and Self-Consciousness
Joseph K. Schear
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 144, No. 1, Selected Papers from the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2008 Meeting (May, 2009), pp. 95-105
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734429
Page Count: 11
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Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers "yes". I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the "interview argument," and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2009 Springer