Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

The Myth of the Categorical Counterfactual

David Barnett
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 144, No. 2 (May, 2009), pp. 281-296
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734444
Page Count: 16
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
The Myth of the Categorical Counterfactual
Preview not available

Abstract

I aim to show that standard theories of counterfactuals are mistaken, not in detail, but in principle, and I aim to say what form a tenable theory must take. Standard theories entail a categorical interpretation of counterfactuals, on which to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state something, not relative to any supposition or hypothesis, but categorically. On the rival suppositional interpretation, to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to statė that it would be that C relative to the supposition that it were that A. The two interpretations make incompatible predictions concerning the correct evaluation of counterfactuals. I argue that the suppositional interpretation makes the correct prediction.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[281]
    [281]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284
  • Thumbnail: Page 
285
    285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
286
    286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
287
    287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
288
    288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
289
    289
  • Thumbnail: Page 
290
    290
  • Thumbnail: Page 
291
    291
  • Thumbnail: Page 
292
    292
  • Thumbnail: Page 
293
    293
  • Thumbnail: Page 
294
    294
  • Thumbnail: Page 
295
    295
  • Thumbnail: Page 
296
    296