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Review: Simulation and the First-Person

Reviewed Work: Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading by Alvin I. Goldman
Review by: Peter Carruthers
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 144, No. 3 (Jun., 2009), pp. 467-475
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27734459
Page Count: 9
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Simulation and the First-Person
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Abstract

This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.

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