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Richard Swinburne's Argument to the Simplicity of God via the Infinite

Jeremy Gwiazda
Religious Studies
Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 2009), pp. 487-493
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27750037
Page Count: 7
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Richard Swinburne's Argument to the Simplicity of God via the Infinite
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Abstract

In "The Coherence of Theism" Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In "The Existence of God" Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in "The Existence of God" (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.

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