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"Non-Scientific Realism" about Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments

Barbara Hannan
Behavior and Philosophy
Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall/Winter, 1990), pp. 21-32
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759221
Page Count: 12
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"Non-Scientific Realism" about Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments
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Abstract

Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.

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