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The Intentionality of Some Ethological Terms
Nicholas S. Thompson and Patrick Derr
Behavior and Philosophy
Vol. 20/21, Vol. 20, no. 2 - Vol. 21, no. 1 (1993), pp. 15-23
Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759280
Page Count: 9
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The apparent incompatibility of mental states with physical explanations has long been a concern of philosophers of psychology. This incompatibility is thought to arise from the intentionality of mental states. But, Brentano notwithstanding, intentionality is an ordinary feature of higher order behavior patterns in the classical literature of ethology.
Behavior and Philosophy © 1993 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)