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Sartre, Skinner, and the Compatibilist Freedom to be Authentically

Martin E. Morf
Behavior and Philosophy
Vol. 26, No. 1/2 (Spring/Fall, 1998), pp. 29-43
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759380
Page Count: 15
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Sartre, Skinner, and the Compatibilist Freedom to be Authentically
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Abstract

An exploration of where a comparison of Sartre and Skinner takes us in attempts to better understand the relationship between the two solitudes or disciplines of psychology: humanistic and scientific psychology. From the splitter's perspective, the Sartrean world appears as the particularly human world of choice; the Skinnerian world as the physical world ruled by necessity. From the lumper's perspective, there appear a number of frequently overlooked similarities between Sartre and Skinner. Taken individually, these similarities are admittedly superficial; but considered collectively they suggest that it is possible to deconstruct the dichotomy of Sartre and Skinner and of the two psychologies.

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