Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise

Dale T. Mortensen
American Journal of Sociology
Vol. 94, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure (1988), pp. S215-S240
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780247
Page Count: 26
Were these topics helpful?
See something inaccurate? Let us know!

Select the topics that are inaccurate.

Cancel
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Add to My Lists
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise
Preview not available

Abstract

How do job-worker and husband-wife relationships form, and why do some matched pairs subsequently separate? Economists and game theorists are in the process of developing and applying an equilibrium explanation of match formation and separation based on the principle of voluntary pairing under competitive conditions. The purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of these developments. The general existence of patnership structures with the property that no one has an incentive to separate has been established. These equilibrium structures maximize aggregate "value" over the set of all feasible match structures in the transferable utility case. According to this pure theory of matching, competition for partners can be expected to yield equilibrium match structures that are both stable and socially efficient, at least under conditions of frictionless certainty. Search-theoretic models that take account of meeting costs and initial uncertainty about match values have been developed to explain separation behavior as a process of shopping for a "good match." These models suggest several possible social inefficiencies in the match formation and separation processes. Finally, labor economists have recently provided empirical evidence that supports this view of the process.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
S215
    S215
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S216
    S216
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S217
    S217
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S218
    S218
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S219
    S219
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S220
    S220
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S221
    S221
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S222
    S222
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S223
    S223
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S224
    S224
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S225
    S225
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S226
    S226
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S227
    S227
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S228
    S228
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S229
    S229
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S230
    S230
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S231
    S231
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S232
    S232
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S233
    S233
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S234
    S234
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S235
    S235
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S236
    S236
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S237
    S237
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S238
    S238
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S239
    S239
  • Thumbnail: Page 
S240
    S240