Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Indispensability argument and anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics

Feng YE
Frontiers of Philosophy in China
Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 2007), pp. 614-628
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27823319
Page Count: 15
  • Download ($34.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Indispensability argument and anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics
Preview not available

Abstract

The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions. 𠡑𠄐𥉷𵤷𥥨𣎘𣕅𵤷𰍀𙦁𡒇𥄐𲕰𤘕𵝰𵝷, 𦅙𶠗𠥠𡌓𤆀𦑩𥥨𣎘𡝆𣎘𠀓𰍀𠄅𵝰𨥦 𨡗. 𵠓𵝰𵝷𠎁𶆂𠄐𙥨𠄣𠕑𵝴. 𰑆𡁩𤁉𦍷𠅔𣕅𶠥𠄣𠕑𵝴𥕒𠦆𶄶𰂗, 𠊔𶠥𠄣𶄶𰂗𶠤𣎄 𢌒𷌥𵈁𰍀𲕰𸔙, 𣕅𶠥𠄣𲕰𸔙𰍀𠑢𴤗, 𡒇𠆗𤍁𠦆𙥨𱆁𦀲𰍀𡑓𣑔𳕈𧠔𥥨𣎘𡝆𣎘, 𠡔𵈁 𨡗𡉓𥌤: 1. 𢌒𥥨𣎘𤈒𩦒𠀓, 𰒕𧒑𣎄𢌒𰍀, 𴦇𩦒𠌖𤀷𠡕𰍀, 𙦁𦅙𥉷𵤷𥥨𣎘𣕅𵤷, 𲞀 𦅙𥄅𠈄𤠙𵤷𥉷𵤷𥥨𣎘𣕅𵤷𦄂𢌒𢠣𳁁𠀓𡀙𶢖𰍀𠡩𢌒𴤠𤑉: 2. 𥄅𠈄𣕅𥥨𣎘𣕅𵤷𰍀𤠙𵤷 𦅙𡑣𣑘𵉦𤘕𦑥𠈔𡁆𲐢𰍀.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[614]
    [614]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
615
    615
  • Thumbnail: Page 
616
    616
  • Thumbnail: Page 
617
    617
  • Thumbnail: Page 
618
    618
  • Thumbnail: Page 
619
    619
  • Thumbnail: Page 
620
    620
  • Thumbnail: Page 
621
    621
  • Thumbnail: Page 
622
    622
  • Thumbnail: Page 
623
    623
  • Thumbnail: Page 
624
    624
  • Thumbnail: Page 
625
    625
  • Thumbnail: Page 
626
    626
  • Thumbnail: Page 
627
    627
  • Thumbnail: Page 
628
    628