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Swing Voting and Fast-Track Authority
James M. DeVault
Southern Economic Journal
Vol. 77, No. 1 (July 2010), pp. 63-77
Published by: Southern Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27866756
Page Count: 15
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Voting, Campaign contributions, Constituents, Legislators, Democratic authority, Political parties, Trade liberalization, Political action committees, Congressional voting, Political partisanship
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Following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994, the United States appeared to be on the verge of an era of unprecedented trade liberalization. Since that time, however, the United States has struggled to pass almost every important trade liberalization bill. Results indicate that the factor most likely responsible for the difficulty in achieving trade liberalization over the last 15 years is shifting pressures within the U.S. House of Representatives related to partisanship and constituency.
Southern Economic Journal © 2010 Southern Economic Association