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Swing Voting and Fast-Track Authority

James M. DeVault
Southern Economic Journal
Vol. 77, No. 1 (July 2010), pp. 63-77
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27866756
Page Count: 15
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Swing Voting and Fast-Track Authority
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Abstract

Following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994, the United States appeared to be on the verge of an era of unprecedented trade liberalization. Since that time, however, the United States has struggled to pass almost every important trade liberalization bill. Results indicate that the factor most likely responsible for the difficulty in achieving trade liberalization over the last 15 years is shifting pressures within the U.S. House of Representatives related to partisanship and constituency.

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