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Gender, Strategies, and Contributions to Public Goods

Jane Sell
Social Psychology Quarterly
Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 252-265
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2787085
Page Count: 14
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Gender, Strategies, and Contributions to Public Goods
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Abstract

This study examines factors affecting cooperation in public goods settings involving relatively small groups. In particular, the gender composition of the group and the history of the group's level of cooperation are investigated. Three game-theoretical predictions are posited. Using expectation states theory and social identity theory, I offer two different sets of hypotheses regarding gender identity. A 3x2 experimental design tests the predictions; the factors are gender composition of the groups and others' behavior. All game theory predictions are supported. Further, for the public goods setting examined, expectation states theories provide more accurate models of groups members's behavior than social identity theories.

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