Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice

Ahmet Alkan, Gabrielle Demange and David Gale
Econometrica
Vol. 59, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 1023-1039
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/2938172
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938172
Page Count: 17
  • Get Access
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($10.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
Preview not available

Abstract

A set of n objects and an amount M of money is to be distributed among m people. Example: the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget. An elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for M sufficiently large the set of efficient, envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure. In particular, various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations which are well behaved with respect to changes of M. This is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
1023
    1023
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1024
    1024
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1025
    1025
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1026
    1026
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1027
    1027
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1028
    1028
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1029
    1029
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1030
    1030
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1031
    1031
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1032
    1032
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1033
    1033
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1034
    1034
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1035
    1035
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1036
    1036
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1037
    1037
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1038
    1038
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1039
    1039