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Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships

Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom and David Pearce
Econometrica
Vol. 59, No. 6 (Nov., 1991), pp. 1713-1733
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/2938286
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938286
Page Count: 21
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Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
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Abstract

In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small.

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