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Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

John Moore and Rafael Repullo
Econometrica
Vol. 58, No. 5 (Sep., 1990), pp. 1083-1099
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/2938301
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938301
Page Count: 17
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Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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Abstract

We extend Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, we establish a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (this was the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--we examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is of course the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, we establish a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. We use our theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments.

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