Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

Explaining Interethnic Cooperation

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 90, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 715-735
DOI: 10.2307/2945838
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945838
Page Count: 21
Were these topics helpful?
See something inaccurate? Let us know!

Select the topics that are inaccurate.

Cancel
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Add to My Lists
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Explaining Interethnic Cooperation
Preview not available

Abstract

Though both journalists and the academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear of this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path." In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
715
    715
  • Thumbnail: Page 
716
    716
  • Thumbnail: Page 
717
    717
  • Thumbnail: Page 
718
    718
  • Thumbnail: Page 
719
    719
  • Thumbnail: Page 
720
    720
  • Thumbnail: Page 
721
    721
  • Thumbnail: Page 
722
    722
  • Thumbnail: Page 
723
    723
  • Thumbnail: Page 
724
    724
  • Thumbnail: Page 
725
    725
  • Thumbnail: Page 
726
    726
  • Thumbnail: Page 
727
    727
  • Thumbnail: Page 
728
    728
  • Thumbnail: Page 
729
    729
  • Thumbnail: Page 
730
    730
  • Thumbnail: Page 
731
    731
  • Thumbnail: Page 
732
    732
  • Thumbnail: Page 
733
    733
  • Thumbnail: Page 
734
    734
  • Thumbnail: Page 
735
    735