You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
Monopoly Pricing of Capacity Usage Under Asymmetric Information
Daniel F. Spulber
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 241-257
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950461
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Consumer economics, Consumer prices, Pricing, Pricing strategies, Marginal costs, Consumer equilibrium, Information asymmetry, Consumer information, Shadow prices, Monopoly
Were these topics helpful?See something inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Preview not available
The design of monopoly pricing strategies is examined in a general framework with an unknown population distribution of consumer characteristics and downward-sloping, multi-unit consumer demand. In addition, the monopolist has increasing marginal cost. Three pricing strategies are shown to implement the profit-maximizing allocation: reference point pricing, multi-unit competitive bidding with variable outputs, and generalized priority service. The analysis of pricing also is extended to include random capacity.
The Journal of Industrial Economics © 1993 Wiley