If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization

Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 85-103
Published by: Wiley
DOI: 10.2307/2950628
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950628
Page Count: 19
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization
Preview not available

Abstract

In this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms. The provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies. We show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization, with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium. We show that when consumers place a high value on software variety, there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
85
    85
  • Thumbnail: Page 
86
    86
  • Thumbnail: Page 
87
    87
  • Thumbnail: Page 
88
    88
  • Thumbnail: Page 
89
    89
  • Thumbnail: Page 
90
    90
  • Thumbnail: Page 
91
    91
  • Thumbnail: Page 
92
    92
  • Thumbnail: Page 
93
    93
  • Thumbnail: Page 
94
    94
  • Thumbnail: Page 
95
    95
  • Thumbnail: Page 
96
    96
  • Thumbnail: Page 
97
    97
  • Thumbnail: Page 
98
    98
  • Thumbnail: Page 
99
    99
  • Thumbnail: Page 
100
    100
  • Thumbnail: Page 
101
    101
  • Thumbnail: Page 
102
    102
  • Thumbnail: Page 
103
    103