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The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies

V. V. Chari, Larry E. Jones and Ramon Marimon
The American Economic Review
Vol. 87, No. 5 (Dec., 1997), pp. 957-976
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951335
Page Count: 20
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The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies
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Abstract

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

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