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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme
Econometrica
Vol. 61, No. 5 (Sep., 1993), pp. 989-1018
Published by: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/2951491
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951491
Page Count: 30
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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
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Abstract

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 × 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.

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