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Feeling Fine About the Mind
Louise M. Antony
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 381-387
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953724
Page Count: 7
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The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 1997 International Phenomenological Society