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Feeling Fine About the Mind

Louise M. Antony
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 381-387
DOI: 10.2307/2953724
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953724
Page Count: 7
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Feeling Fine About the Mind
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Abstract

The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.

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