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You Can Always Count on Reliabilism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. 57, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 607-617
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953752
Page Count: 11
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This article considers some recent objections to reliabilism, particularly those of Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry. Haack complains that reliabilism solves the "ratification" problem trivially, making it analytic that evidence relates to truth; this paper defends an analytic solution to this problem. It argues as well that reliabilism is not tacitly committed to "evidentialism." Familiar counterexamples to and repairs of reliabilism are reviewed, with an eye to finding their rationale. Finally, it suggests that the underlying dispute between reliabilism and its critics is the existence of a priori relations between evidence and hypotheses.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research © 1997 International Phenomenological Society