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Agreeing to Disagree

Robert J. Aumann
The Annals of Statistics
Vol. 4, No. 6 (Nov., 1976), pp. 1236-1239
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2958591
Page Count: 4
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Agreeing to Disagree
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Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

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