If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics

Avinash Dixit and John Londregan
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1996), pp. 1132-1155
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960152
Page Count: 24
  • Download PDF
  • Cite this Item

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Preview not available

Abstract

We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, then the outcome of the process conforms to the "swing voter" theory: both parties woo the groups that are politically central, and most willing to switch their votes in response to economic favors. If groups have party affinities, and each party is more effective in delivering favors to its own support group, then we can get the "machine politics" outcome, where each party favors its core support group. We derive these results theoretically, and illustrate their operation in particular examples.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[1132]
    [1132]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1133
    1133
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1134
    1134
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1135
    1135
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1136
    1136
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1137
    1137
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1138
    1138
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1139
    1139
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1140
    1140
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[1141]
    [1141]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1142
    1142
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1143
    1143
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1144
    1144
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1145
    1145
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1146
    1146
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1147
    1147
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1148
    1148
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1149
    1149
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1150
    1150
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1151
    1151
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1152
    1152
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1153
    1153
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1154
    1154
  • Thumbnail: Page 
1155
    1155