You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Checks and Choices: The House Bank Scandal's Impact on Voters in 1992
Michael A. Dimock and Gary C. Jacobson
The Journal of Politics
Vol. 57, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 1143-1159
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960406
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Incumbents, Voting, Checks, Political partisanship, Voting patterns, Guilt, Writing tables, Political science, Banks, Political campaigns
Were these topics helpful?See somethings inaccurate? Let us know!
Select the topics that are inaccurate.
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
Analysis of the 1992 American National Election Study (ANES) data indicates that the House bank scandal reduced the vote for House incumbents by approximately five percentage points. The scandal mainly affected the small subset of voters who were most offended by bank overdrafts and who did not assume that their representative had a clean record. Fortunately for members who had written bad checks, voters who knew about the transgression were least disposed to be outraged by it, while the voters most disposed to outrage were also most inclined to believe the guilty were innocent. The explanation for these curious patterns is that voters who faced the option of condemning an incumbent they otherwise appreciated or dismissing the offense as inconsequential often chose the latter course. The damage was also moderated by partisanship; voters of the incumbent's party showed a strong tendency to err in the incumbent's favor in assessing involvement in the scandal. The classical theory of cognitive dissonance readily explains both phenomena.
The Journal of Politics © 1995 The University of Chicago Press