Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court

Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs and Forrest Maltzman
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 294-315
DOI: 10.2307/2991757
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991757
Page Count: 22
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court
Preview not available

Abstract

Theory: Supreme Court opinion authors make strategic calculations about the need to craft opinions that are acceptable to their colleagues on the bench. Hypotheses: The willingness of justices to accommodate their colleagues depends upon the size and ideological makeup of the majority conference coalition and the number of suggestions and threats issued by their colleagues. These strategic considerations are important even after controlling for a series of nonstrategic factors, such as case complexity. Method: To examine the extent of accommodation in Supreme Court cases, we examine the number of draft opinions circulated by the majority opinion author. We use a Generalized Event Count model to determine whether strategic or nonstrategic efforts influence the amount of accommodation that occurs. Results: We show that accommodation is influenced strongly by strategic concerns-including the size of the majority conference coalition, the ideological distance of the author from the majority coalition, the ideological heterogeneity of the conference majority coalition, and the positions taken by majority coalition members and by nonstrategic factors, including the author's workload and the complexity of a case.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[294]
    [294]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
295
    295
  • Thumbnail: Page 
296
    296
  • Thumbnail: Page 
297
    297
  • Thumbnail: Page 
298
    298
  • Thumbnail: Page 
299
    299
  • Thumbnail: Page 
300
    300
  • Thumbnail: Page 
301
    301
  • Thumbnail: Page 
302
    302
  • Thumbnail: Page 
303
    303
  • Thumbnail: Page 
304
    304
  • Thumbnail: Page 
305
    305
  • Thumbnail: Page 
306
    306
  • Thumbnail: Page 
307
    307
  • Thumbnail: Page 
308
    308
  • Thumbnail: Page 
309
    309
  • Thumbnail: Page 
310
    310
  • Thumbnail: Page 
311
    311
  • Thumbnail: Page 
312
    312
  • Thumbnail: Page 
313
    313
  • Thumbnail: Page 
314
    314
  • Thumbnail: Page 
315
    315