Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action

John T. Scholz and Mark Lubell
American Journal of Political Science
Vol. 42, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 398-417
DOI: 10.2307/2991764
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991764
Page Count: 20
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action
Preview not available

Abstract

Theory: Trust is a critical attitude that extends the duty heuristic developed in Scholz and Pinney (1995). The "trust heuristic" can provide the basis for a contingent compliance strategy capable of sustaining cooperative solutions to collective action problems of governance if two conditions are met. First, compliance with laws must be conditional on levels of trust in specific legal arenas. Second, a citizen's trust in government and trust in other citizens' willingness to obey the law must reflect the costs and benefits associated with obeying laws. Hypothesis: This article tests the first hypothesis in the tax arena: trust in government and in other citizens increase compliance over and above the levels expected from an internalized sense of duty to obey laws and the fear of getting caught by enforcement agencies like the IRS. Method: We test the hypotheses with regression analysis of survey and tax return data from a stratified sample of 299 middle- and upper-income taxpayers, using the newly-developed two-stage conditional maximum likelihood analysis to control for endogeneity. We extend this approach to the analysis of multi-categorical ordered dependent variables. Findings: Both dimensions of trust significantly increase the likelihood of tax compliance, even after controlling for duty, fear, selection bias, and potential endogeneity effects.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[398]
    [398]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
399
    399
  • Thumbnail: Page 
400
    400
  • Thumbnail: Page 
401
    401
  • Thumbnail: Page 
402
    402
  • Thumbnail: Page 
403
    403
  • Thumbnail: Page 
404
    404
  • Thumbnail: Page 
405
    405
  • Thumbnail: Page 
406
    406
  • Thumbnail: Page 
407
    407
  • Thumbnail: Page 
408
    408
  • Thumbnail: Page 
409
    409
  • Thumbnail: Page 
410
    410
  • Thumbnail: Page 
411
    411
  • Thumbnail: Page 
412
    412
  • Thumbnail: Page 
413
    413
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[414]
    [414]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
[415]
    [415]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
416
    416
  • Thumbnail: Page 
417
    417