Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Cycles in Senatorial Voting Behavior: Implications for the Optimal Frequency of Elections

Ryan C. Amacher and William J. Boyes
Public Choice
Vol. 33, No. 3 (1978), pp. 5-13
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30023045
Page Count: 9
  • Download ($43.95)
  • Cite this Item
Cycles in Senatorial Voting Behavior: Implications for the Optimal Frequency of Elections
Preview not available

Abstract

The effect that the length of electoral periods has on the behavior of elected officials is examined. The hypothesis is that the longer the period between elections the less responsible or the more independent representatives will behave relative to the desires of their polity. The hypothesis is tested by examining the behavior of U.S. Senators. It is found that their independence follows a cyclical behavior which conforms to the electoral period. As a result it is by no means clear that decreasing the frequency of elections reduces the cost of elections. The effect of this independence cost on the optimal frequency of elections is discussed.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[5]
    [5]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
6
    6
  • Thumbnail: Page 
7
    7
  • Thumbnail: Page 
8
    8
  • Thumbnail: Page 
9
    9
  • Thumbnail: Page 
10
    10
  • Thumbnail: Page 
11
    11
  • Thumbnail: Page 
12
    12
  • Thumbnail: Page 
13
    13