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Club Theory: Thirty Years Later

Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart
Public Choice
Vol. 93, No. 3/4 (1997), pp. 335-355
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024305
Page Count: 21
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Club Theory: Thirty Years Later
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Abstract

This paper presents a self-contained survey of club theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the last fifteen years. Club goods are contrasted with pure public goods, and equilibrium and optimality notions are contrasted. After presenting three basic representations of club theory, we focus on recent advances and generalizations that include heterogeneous memberships, transaction costs, uncertain utilization, asymmetric information, and noncompetitive influences. An agenda for research is indicated that includes further analysis of asymmetric information, institutional structure, and applications.

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