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Intervention Analysis of Electoral Tax Cycle: The Case of Japan

Keum-Rok Yoo
Public Choice
Vol. 96, No. 3/4 (1998), pp. 241-258
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024392
Page Count: 18
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Intervention Analysis of Electoral Tax Cycle: The Case of Japan
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Abstract

This paper analyzed the impact of elections on tax policy in Japan using an ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average)-intervention analysis from 1953 through 1992. We used discretionary tax revenues, which means the changes in tax receipts attributable to changes in the tax code, rather than automatic tax revenues due to business cycles in the economy. The result of this study shows that there is a political tax cycle in Japan. That is, discretionary tax revenues decrease with a statistically significant amount in a year immediately before elections for the House of Representatives. This may be due to the fact that election timings in Japan with a parliamentary system become endogenous.

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