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The Effects of Congressional Rules about Bill Cosponsorship on Duplicate Bills: Changing Incentives for Credit Claiming

Scott Thomas and Bernard Grofman
Public Choice
Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 93-98
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025741
Page Count: 6
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The Effects of Congressional Rules about Bill Cosponsorship on Duplicate Bills: Changing Incentives for Credit Claiming
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Abstract

We generate for the first time a time series that allows us to identify the number of duplicate bills in Congresses operating under different rules about the cosponsorship of bills. We show that changes in the congressional rules about bill cosponsorship affected the number of duplicate bills in a way fully consistent with a public choice perspective on legislative "credit claiming."

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