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Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal?

Francisco Candel-Sánchez and Juan Cristóbal Campoy-Miñarro
Public Choice
Vol. 120, No. 1/2 (Jul., 2004), pp. 29-39
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025828
Page Count: 11
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Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal?
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that the linear penalization to inflation found in Walsh (1995) is not the government's optimal choice when the fixed part of the transfer scheme is any given constant and the payment to the central bank represents a cost for the government.

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