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The Theory of Economic Regulation
George J. Stigler
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1971), pp. 3-21
Published by: RAND Corporation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3003160
Page Count: 19
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Occupational licensing, Industrial regulation, Voting, Truck farming, Political parties, Trucking, Regulatory theory, Political processes, Rail industry, Economic regulation
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The potential uses of public resources and powers to improve the economic status of economic groups (such as industries and occupations) are analyzed to provide a scheme of the demand for regulation. The characteristics of the political process which allow relatively small groups to obtain such regulation is then sketched to provide elements of a theory of supply of regulation. A variety of empirical evidence and illustration is also presented.
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science © 1971 RAND Corporation